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Not a General Regulatory Power —
A Comment on Reference re Assisted
Human Reproduction Act
Graeme G. Mitchell∗
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of the criminal law power located in section 91(27)
of the Constitution Act, 18671 as a general regulatory power for Parliament began in earnest during the final decades of the 20th century. An
expansive regulatory function for section 91(27), the most breathtaking
example of which remains R. v. Hydro Québec,2 appeared secure after
Reference re Firearms Act (Canada)3 where the Supreme Court of
Canada sustained the constitutionality of the Firearms Act4 which
amended the Criminal Code5 and created an exhaustive licensing and
registration statute for firearms owners. However, Reference re Assisted
Human Reproduction Act6 delivered at the close of 2010 signals that at
least a majority of the current justices has grown uneasy about an everexpanding regulatory capacity for the criminal law. An unusually
∗
Q.C., Director, Constitutional Law Branch, Saskatchewan Ministry of Justice and Attorney General, Regina. The views expressed in this article do not represent the views of the Attorney
General for Saskatchewan or his Ministry. Candour commends I disclose my participation as counsel
for the Attorney General in two judgments referred to in this paper: Reference re Firearms Act
(Canada), [2000] S.C.J. No. 31, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783 (S.C.C.), and Reference re Assisted Human
Reproduction Act, [2010] S.C.J. No. 61, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 457 (S.C.C.). I am indebted to my friend,
John D. Whyte, Q.C., for generously sharing with me his insights on this Reference and a draft copy
of his paper, “Federalism and Moral Regulation: A Comment on Reference re Assisted Human
Reproduction Act” (2011) 74 Sask. L. Rev. 45. I also want to acknowledge with appreciation
Professor Bruce Ryder for his excellent editorial comments on an earlier version of this article,
which was presented at the Osgoode Hall 2010 Constitutional Cases Conference on April 15, 2011.
1
(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.
2
[1997] S.C.J. No. 76, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hydro-Québec”].
3
[2000] S.C.J. No. 31, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Firearms Reference”].
4
S.C. 1995, c. 39.
5
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
6
[2010] S.C.J. No. 61, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 457 (S.C.C.) (sub nom Attorney General of Canada
v. Attorney General of Quebec) [hereinafter “RAHRA”].
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fractured Court (4-4-1) declared numerous regulatory provisions found in
the Assisted Human Reproduction Act7 ultra vires Parliament principally
for the reason they impermissibly invaded exclusive provincial legislative jurisdiction in relation to health, hospitals, medical facilities and the
medical profession. RAHRA also offers important insights into how the
characterization aspect of the pith and substance analysis and the
ancillary powers doctrine should operate in disputes over the proper
application of the division of federal and provincial legislative powers.
Regulation is, of course, a function of the criminal law; however,
such regulation is traditionally prohibitory in nature. With the emergence
of the modern regulatory state, governments began to utilize penal
offences to regulate and control anti-social conduct. Over time courts
came to tolerate non-punitive civic regulation as a legitimate objective of
the criminal law power. Regulatory regimes of this kind were characterized variously as “carve outs” or exemptions from the penal aspects of
the statute which directly obtained their constitutional sustenance from
section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867.8 Provided the statute
furthered a valid criminal law purpose — an amorphous concept to be
sure — and was connected to a prohibition coupled with a penalty, courts
endorsed massive regulatory frameworks created by Parliament which
were built upon a narrow platform of penal provisions. Indeed, it was on
this basis that the Supreme Court upheld the extensive environmental
regulatory regime found in the Canadian Environmental Protection Act9
and the cradle-to-grave regulation of firearms ownership established in
the Firearms Act.10
In light of this constitutional pedigree, the regulatory elements of the
AHR Act at first blush might appear to be on firm jurisdictional footing.
Thus, when the Government of Quebec sought an advisory opinion from
the Quebec Court of Appeal respecting the constitutionality of those
provisions it seemed these should pass constitutional muster. To be sure,
the areas regulated by the AHR Act were more closely aligned to areas of
exclusive provincial legislative jurisdiction than those at issue in either
Hydro-Québec or the Firearms Reference. At the same time, it did not
appear to be too long a bow to draw to bring matters related to health
care services and medical research within “‘the criminal law in its widest
7
8
9
10

S.C. 2004, c. 2 [hereinafter “AHR Act”].
See notes 106-108, infra, and accompanying text.
R.S.C. 1985, c. 16 (4th Supp.); Hydro-Québec, supra, note 2.
Firearms Reference, supra, note 3.
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sense’”.11 However, should the constitutionality of these provisions be
sustained, it would mean section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867 had
truly evolved into the general regulatory power for the Parliament of
Canada.
The Quebec Court of Appeal, fearing such a consequence, unanimously declared the disputed sections of the AHR Act unconstitutional.12
Drawing on classical Greek mythology, the Quebec appeals court
asserted that to characterize assisted human reproduction practices and
research as “subject matters relating to the criminal law rather than
health could create a Trojan horse that would significantly reduce
provincial jurisdiction over health by permitting exhaustive regulation of
other fields of medical practice, particularly those that have recently been
developed”.13 The Attorney General of Canada appealed this judgment to
the Supreme Court and after more than a year and a half — 20 months to
be exact — of deliberation, the Court released its judgment.
Three opinions were filed, opinions which are not models of clarity.
Four judges led by McLachlin C.J.C. (Binnie, Fish and Charron JJ.
concurring) found the AHR Act in its entirety to be a valid exercise of the
criminal law power. Four judges speaking through LeBel and Deschamps
JJ. (Abella and Rothstein JJ. concurring) held that while the absolute
prohibitions against certain assisted human reproduction practices
described in the statute as “Prohibited Activities” were constitutional, the
impugned regulatory sections which formed the bulk of the statute were
not. Justice Cromwell wrote separately. He agreed with LeBel and
Deschamps JJ.’s pith and substance analysis; yet, he parted company
with them in respect of certain of the regulatory provisions at issue. In
the end, the Court allowed the appeal in part with the result that the AHR
Act is now more streamlined and narrower in its focus.
RAHRA is the most significant ruling respecting the regulatory function of section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867 since Hydro-Québec.
Yet, the case received scant attention in legal and academic circles
outside Quebec until after the Supreme Court released its judgment. In
11
Hydro-Québec, supra, note 2, at para. 119, per La Forest J. (emphasis in original), quoting Ontario (Attorney General) v. Hamilton Street Railway, [1903] A.C. 524, at 528-29 (P.C.). But
see Patrick Healy, “Statutory Prohibitions and the Regulation of New Reproductive Technologies
under Federal Law in Canada” (1995) 40 McGill L.J. 905, for a pre-Hydro-Québec, yet nevertheless
powerful, critique of utilizing the criminal law power to regulate assisted reproductive technologies.
12
Renvoi relative à la Loi sur la procreation assistée (Canada), [2008] J.Q.J. No. 5489,
2008 QCCA 1157, 298 D.L.R. (4th) 712 (Q.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Quebec Reference”].
13
Id., at para. 141.
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this paper I explore the influence RAHRA may have on the future use of
the criminal law power as a mechanism for wide-ranging civic regulation. My thesis is that the Court is moving away from an unbridled
acceptance of this role for section 91(27). The paper proceeds in four
parts. Part II will offer an overview of the AHR Act with particular
attention given to those aspects of the legislation attacked in RAHRA.
Part III will analyze the three opinions filed in the Supreme Court. Part
IV will attempt to identify the doctrinal significance of RAHRA and will
anticipate its implications for future federalism disputes. Part V will
consider the regulation of health generally and of assisted reproduction
technologies particularly in the wake of RAHRA.

II. THE ASSISTED HUMAN REPRODUCTION ACT — ITS GENESIS
AND ARCHITECTURE
When a government — federal or provincial — refers the issue of a
proposed law’s constitutionality to an appeals court for an advisory
opinion, legislative context is always relevant. Yet in RAHRA such
context gains heightened significance. In order to understand the Court’s
ultimate disposition, it is necessary to have a good appreciation of not
only the impugned sections of the AHR Act, their relationship to the
uncontested provisions (largely prohibitions and offence sections) and
the architecture of the overall statutory scheme. This becomes essential
since Cromwell J.’s controlling opinion turns very much on the specific
subject matter of the impugned provisions and their connection to other
provisions the constitutionality of which was not challenged.
After a number of false starts, Parliament finally enacted the AHR
Act on March 29, 2004.14 This followed an extended period of study and
consultation by academics, medical practitioners and researchers, as well
as government officials at both the federal and provincial levels, and
represented the culmination of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies chaired by Dr. Patricia Baird. The Baird Commission began its work in 1989 and for the next four years studied the thorny
legal, ethical and scientific questions thrown up by the emergence of new
reproductive technologies. In its Final Report delivered in 1993 entitled
Proceed With Care, the Baird Commission recommended that Parliament
14
For a recounting of the statute’s difficulty history see: Quebec Reference, supra, note 12,
at paras. 4-24.
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utilize its criminal law power to prohibit certain reproductive technologies
such as human cloning and the creation of animal-human hybrids.15 The
Commission further proposed the establishment of a national administrative body to regulate and oversee the reproductive technologies Parliament deemed appropriate and to license medical practitioners and
researchers wishing to administer and investigate those technologies.
These two general recommendations found their way into the AHR Act.
The AHR Act is comprised of 17 parts, not all of which Quebec attacked. In broad compass, the statute pertains to all clinical and research
activities relating to assisted human reproductive technologies. It
established two categories of activities: Prohibited Activities and Controlled Activities. No exception was taken to most of the sections
characterized as Prohibited Activities which comprise the bulk of the
prohibitions created by the statute. Rather, Quebec objected to numerous
sections relating to Controlled Activities.
The AHR Act statute opens with a broad declaration of principles
found in section 2, principles not customarily advanced by the criminal
law. These include Parliament’s intention to promote matters such as the
“health and well-being of children born through the application of
assisted human reproductive technologies” (subsection 2(a)); “the
benefits of assisted human reproductive technologies and related research
for individuals, for families and for society in general” (subsection 2(b));
“the health and well-being of women … in the application of these
technologies” (subsection 2(c)), and the protection of “human individuality and diversity, and the integrity of the human genome” (subsection
2(g)).
The Prohibited Activities that are created by, and form the core of,
the AHR Act are located in sections 5 to 9.16 Section 5 prohibits various
assisted reproductive practices that Parliament deems unacceptable.
These include human cloning (subsection 5(1)(a)); creating an in vitro
embryo for any purpose other than creating a human being (subsection
15
Final Report of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Proceed
With Care (Ottawa, 1993), at 106-25, referenced in the Quebec Reference, id., at para. 4.
16
Section 60 of the AHR Act created the offence and penalties for a breach of any of these
sections. Section 61 created the offence and penalties for breaches of any of the sections of the AHR
Act and the regulations other than those found in sections 5 to 9. These sections impose sanctions
from a fine to a maximum of $500,000 to imprisonment to a maximum of 10 years. The Court
sustained the constitutionality of these provisions but only to the extent they applied to constitutionally valid sections of the RAHRA, supra, note 6, at para. 155, per McLachlin C.J.C.; at para. 175, per
LeBel and Deschamps JJ., and at para. 293, per Cromwell J.

638

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d)

5(1)(b)); creating an embryo from a cell or part of a cell of an embryo or
foetus (subsection 5(1)(c)); altering a genome of a cell such that the
alteration may be transmitted to descendants (subsection 5(1)(f)), and
using, manipulating or transplanting reproductive material of a nonhuman life from chimeras or hybrids to create a human being (subsection
5(1)(g) to (j)). Sections 6 and 7 prohibit the unauthorized commercialization of the reproductive functions of men and women, especially the
payment of consideration to a surrogate mother. However, section 12
blunts the effect of these particular prohibitions by allowing surrogate
mothers, and sperm or ova donors to be reimbursed for their expenses,
provided these activities accord with the regulations or a licence issued
under the AHR Act.17 Section 8 prohibits the non-consensual use of both
in vitro embryos or posthumous removal of human reproductive material.
Finally, section 9 prohibits the harvesting or use of sperm or ova from a
donor less than 18 years of age unless it will be used to create a human
being who will be raised by the donor.
The Controlled Activities are located in sections 10 to 13 of the AHR
Act and Quebec attacked the constitutional validity of all of them. The
statute prohibits activities of this kind unless they are carried out in
accordance with regulations promulgated under the statute. A variety of
medical practices and procedures fell into this category including the use
of human reproductive material to create embryos (section 10); research
into transgenics which is the practice of combining human genes with
those of animal species (section 11), and carrying out controlled activities only in premises licensed under the AHR Act (section 13).
Sections 14 through 19 of the AHR Act establish a comprehensive
statutory regime pertaining to the collection and retention of personal
health information of persons who seek assisted human reproduction
technologies. This regime requires the mandatory collection of such
private health information (section 14); enumerates circumstances when
such information may be disclosed (sections 15 and 18); permits access to
or the destruction of private health information in specific circumstances
(section 16), and creates a registry for such information (section 17).
The AHR Act also creates an administrative body described as the Assisted Human Reproduction Agency of Canada (the “Agency”) (section
21) and gives to the federal Minister of Health the responsibility of
17
For a comparative review of the legality of surrogacy fees and expenses in the United States,
see M. Holcomb & M. Byrn, “When Your Body is Your Business” (2010) 85 Wash. L. Rev. 647.
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establishing the Government of Canada’s policy of assisted human
reproduction as well as overseeing the Agency’s operations (section 20).
The Agency is responsible for administering the legislation and is
statutorily mandated (a) “to protect and promote the health and safety,
and the human dignity and human rights, of Canadians, and (b) to foster
the application of ethical principles, in relation to assisted human
reproduction and other matters” covered by the AHR Act (section 22).
These responsibilities include establishing a personal health information
registry, licensing medical professionals wishing to deliver, or to conduct
research into, a controlled activity (section 40), as well as, licensing
medical facilities to carry out controlled activities (subsection 40(5)). This
Part of the AHR Act also creates the entire organizational organization
structure of the Agency, including its board of directors (sections 26 and
28), advisory panel (section 33), and the offices of Chairperson (section
34), Vice-Chairperson (section 34) and President (sections 36, 37).
As well, the AHR Act contains extensive administrative and enforcement powers. These include the designation of investigators (section 46);
rights of entry for inspectors (section 47); a warrant requirement for entry
into a dwelling house (section 48), and the power to seize any information
or material which an inspector believes on reasonable grounds is evidence
of a contravention of the statute (sections 50 and 53).
The final section of the AHR Act which Quebec challenged was section 68. This provision recognized equivalency agreements — agreements between the federal government and a provincial government —
declaring that if the province in question had enacted legislation the
federal government deemed to be equivalent to the AHR Act, it would
withhold the application of the federal law’s regulatory aspects in that
particular jurisdiction. At the time the Quebec Court of Appeal decided
the Reference, the Quebec government had placed before the National
Assembly Bill 23 entitled An Act respecting clinical and research
activities relating to assisted procreation,18 but it had not yet been
enacted into law. The new law came into force in June 2009 after the
Supreme Court hearing, but it played no role in the Court’s judgment.19
As is common with regulatory statutes, much of the work is done in
the regulations, and adhering to this model the AHR Act contains in
18

Quebec Reference, supra, note 12, at para. 17.
RAHRA, supra, note 6, at para. 7. The law is An Act respecting clinical and research
activities relating to assisted procreation, R.S.Q., c. A-5.01.
19
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section 65 a wide-ranging regulation-making power. It authorizes the
Minister of Health to make regulations for most sections of the legislation. An unusual feature of this regulation making power is the requirement found in section 66 that any regulation must be tabled in both the
House of Commons and the Senate before it can become law. Typically,
regulations are promulgated with little, if any, prior public scrutiny, so
the additional requirement for regulations enacted under the AHR Act is
noteworthy, if not doctrinally significant.

III. THE JUDGMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Three opinions were filed. Both McLachlin C.J.C. (Binnie, Fish and
Charron JJ., concurring), and LeBel and Deschamps JJ. (Abella and
Rothstein JJ. concurring) wrote lengthy judgments coming to opposite
conclusions: McLachlin C.J.C. sustained the constitutionality of the AHR
Act, while LeBel and Deschamps JJ. accepted only the offence provisions of the statute as valid exercises of the criminal law power. In a
laconic but pivotal opinion Cromwell J. approved of certain of the
regulatory features of the legislation provided their operation was closely
linked to those sections he found to be constitutional. This uncommon
division among the judges makes it difficult to identify a majority view
with precision. Respecting doctrinal issues, Cromwell J. adopts generally
the analysis contained in LeBel and Deschamps JJ.’s joint opinion.20 For
this reason, it may be said that their opinion represents the majority view
on matters of doctrine. However, in the application of this doctrine,
Cromwell J.’s opinion is dispositive and governs the result in RAHRA.
1. The Opinion of Chief Justice McLachlin
In her reasons for judgment, McLachlin C.J.C. endorsed a plenary
reading of section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867. She opened by
asserting that assisted reproductive technologies present some of “the
most important moral issues faced by this generation” of Canadians.21
Chief Justice MacLachlin’s characterization of the subject matter
regulated by the AHR Act as predominantly a moral issue led her to find

20
21

RAHRA, id., at paras. 285-288.
Id., at para. 1.
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the statute as a whole fulfilled a valid criminal law purpose. She elaborated on her characterization as follows:
Criminal law may target conduct that Parliament reasonably
apprehends as a threat to our central moral precepts … Moral
disapprobation is itself sufficient to ground criminal law when it
addresses issues that are integral to society.
.....
Assisted reproduction raises weighty moral concerns. The creation
of human life and the processes by which it is altered and extinguished,
as well as the impact this may have on affected parties, lie at the heart
of morality. Parliament has a strong interest in ensuring that basic
moral standards govern the creation and destruction of life, as well as
their impact on persons like donors and mothers. Taken as a whole, the
Act seeks to avert serious damage to the fabric of our society by
prohibiting practices that tend to devalue human life and degrade
participants. This is a valid criminal law purpose, grounded in issues
that our society considers to be of fundamental importance.22

Indeed, characterizing morality as “the principal criminal law object of
[the AHR Act]”23 influenced all aspects of McLachlin C.J.C.’s federalism
analysis from the pith and substance inquiry to the operation of the
ancillary powers doctrine.
Morality, of course, is an extremely broad and subjective concept, a
reality which the Chief Justice acknowledged but discounted.24 Yet,
because of its imprecision morality can easily become a proxy for
extending the reach of the criminal law power into legitimate areas of
provincial legislative jurisdiction. Historically, Parliament used the
criminal law to enforce “conventional standards of propriety”25 best
illustrated by prohibitions against sexual immorality, debauchery and
other displays of public wantonness. Over time courts expanded the
concept of morality to include “societal values beyond the simply
22

Id., at paras. 50 and 61 (citations omitted).
Id., at para. 48.
Id., at para. 50. (“Different people hold different views about issues such as the artificial
creation of human life. However, under federalism analysis, the focus is on the importance of the
moral issue, not whether there is societal consensus on how it should be resolved. Parliament need
only have a reasonable basis to expect that its legislation will address a moral concern of fundamental importance[.]”)
25
R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, at para. 77
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Malmo-Levine”].
23
24
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prurient or prudish”26, or as Sopinka J. grandly characterized them in R.
v. Butler27 “values which are integral to a free and democratic society”.28
It is not difficult to anticipate that such an expansive conception of
public morality may result in an overly generous interpretation of section
91(27). This is especially so in relation to medical research where scientific advances and the development of cutting-edge medical technologies
may challenge the religious and moral convictions of many Canadians.
Does it follow then that these emerging technologies too may be subject
to regulation under the criminal law power? The Quebec Court of
Appeal29 and at least four of McLachlin C.J.C.’s colleagues30 worried
this may be so. Yet the Chief Justice deflected the issue by suggesting
such concerns are exaggerated:
Different medical experiments and treatments will raise different
issues. Few will raise “moral” issues of an order approaching those
inherent in reproductive technologies. The federal criminal law at issue
in this case does not threaten “the constitutional balance”.31

Having selected morality as the predominant criminal law purpose
advanced by the AHR Act, McLachlin C.J.C. identified two secondary
rationales for grounding its constitutionality in section 91(27). These are
health and personal security.32 As with morality, she adopted a broad
view of the type of public health issues which legitimately will fall
within the ambit of the criminal law. These share three common elements, namely, “(1) human conduct that (2) has an injurious or undesirable effect (3) on the health of members of the public”.33 Invoking La
Forest J.’s judgment in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney
General),34 McLachlin C.J.C. asserted that “Parliament is entitled to use
the criminal law power to safeguard the public from conduct that may
have an injurious or undesirable effect on the health of members of the
public, notwithstanding the provinces’ general right to regulate the
26

Id.
[1992] S.C.J. No. 15, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (S.C.C.).
28
Id., at para. 80.
29
Supra, note 12, at paras. 140 and 141.
30
RAHRA, supra, note 6, at paras. 254-257, per LeBel and Deschamps JJ.
31
Id., at para. 74.
32
Id., at para. 48. (“The objects of prohibiting public health evils and promoting security
play supporting roles with respect to some provisions.”)
33
Id., at para. 54.
34
[1995] S.C.J. No. 68, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “RJR-MacDonald”].
27
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medical profession.”35 Here, too, she downplayed objections that because
most if not all “medical practices come with risks”36 they potentially
could be subject to criminal sanction, and counters that “conduct with
little or no threat of harm is unlikely to qualify as a ‘public health
evil’.”37 She asserted that how “assisted reproduction techniques are used
can mean the difference between life and death, health and sickness”38
with the consequence that their abuse “poses risks to the health of the
population and may legitimately be considered a public health evil to be
addressed by the criminal law”.39 This, however, does not blunt the force
of the objection.
Finally, McLachlin C.J.C. accepted that protection of personal security is also “peripherally”40 relevant here because certain aspects of the
AHR Act purport to protect vulnerable groups seeking access to assisted
reproductive technologies, most especially women. It cannot be disputed
that preserving personal security is a fundamentally important objective
advanced by the criminal law. However, despite an apparent paucity of
evidence on the record to support such a claim, McLachlin C.J.C. was
prepared to accept this objective as being furthered by the AHR Act
noting simply that such concerns “are easy to envision”.41
The significance of McLachlin C.J.C. grounding the basis for the
exercise of the criminal law power in the enforcement of public morality
is apparent. It is a broadly defined, subjectively assessed standard which
can become quite diffuse when applied. It is, perhaps, the most expansive
of the broad purposes accepted by the Supreme Court as appropriate for
the operation of the criminal law.42 As a consequence, it is ample enough
to sustain most laws sought to be defended under section 91(27). Moreover, identifying health related concerns as only a subsidiary rationale
underlying the AHR Act legislation is a curious way to characterize a
statute which patently relates to health services and to health professionals.
35
RAHRA, supra, note 6, at para. 57, expressly referencing para. 32 of La Forest J.’s judgment in RJR-MacDonald, id.
36
RAHRA, id.
37
Id., at para. 56, 1 referencing Malmo-Levine, supra, note 25, at para. 212, per Arbour J.
38
RAHRA, id., at para. 62.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id., at para. 63.
42
The others are public peace, order, security and health: Reference re Validity of Section
5(a) of the Dairy Industry Act (Canada), [1948] S.C.J. No. 42, [1949] S.C.R. 1, at 50 (S.C.C.), per
Rand J. [hereinafter “Margarine Reference”].
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Yet her characterization of the statute as principally protecting public
morality allowed McLachlin C.J.C. to hold that “the legislative scheme is
not directed toward the promotion of positive health measure, but rather
addresses legitimate criminal law objects.”43 Since “the other two
elements of criminal law, prohibition and penalty, are established on the
face of the Act … the Assisted Human Reproduction Act, viewed as a
whole, is valid criminal legislation.”44 The Chief Justice’s approach
allowed her to relegate the significant health law aspects of the statute to
a secondary role. This, in turn, determined how she applied the ancillary
powers doctrine.
Chief Justice McLachlin acknowledged that most of the impugned
sections of the legislation did not qualify as criminal law in the traditional sense45 but instead operated as “large carve-outs for practices that
Parliament does not wish to prohibit”.46 In order to sustain the constitutionality of these regulatory aspects of the legislation she employed two
doctrines of Canadian constitutional law: (1) Parliament’s authority to
create elaborate regulatory schemes under section 91(27); and (2) the
ancillary powers doctrine. Taken together, the application of these
doctrines persuaded her that the AHR Act in its entirety was intra vires
Parliament.
Chief Justice McLachlin advocated a robust regulatory function for
the criminal law power provided it furthered “the law’s criminal purpose”.47 She explained that “evolving technologies” such as assisted
reproduction require “a nuanced scheme consisting of a mixture of
absolute prohibitions, selective prohibitions based on regulations, and
supporting administrative provisions”.48 A framework of this flexibility
will need to be highly regulatory particularly as it relates to complex
modern medical practices and technologies. Yet, for McLachlin C.J.C.
this degree of regulation appears to be of little moment since “the extent
or comprehensiveness of a criminal law regulatory scheme does not
affect its constitutionality” provided it “reflects and furthers proper
criminal law goals”.49
43

RAHRA, supra, note 6, at para. 64.
Id.
45
Id., at para. 125.
46
Id., at para. 38.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id., at para. 85, citing RJR-MacDonald, supra, note 34, and Firearms Reference, supra,
note 3, in support.
44
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It was on this basis that she sustained the constitutionality of the remaining provisions relating to Prohibited Activities, namely, sections 8
through 13 of the AHR Act.50 These sections regulated in whole or in part
practices such as donors’ consent to use ova or sperm, subsidizing donors
or surrogates for their expenses, and the licensing of medical facilities
where such procedures likely would take place. These various provisions,
McLachlin C.J.C. concluded, regulate discrete aspects of assisted
reproductive technologies which are more generally prohibited in
sections 5 to 7 of the legislation, sections that were not impugned.
Chief Justice McLachlin sustained the constitutionality of the balance of the AHR Act by invoking the ancillary powers doctrine. This
doctrine “holds that legislative provisions which, in pith and substance,
fall outside the jurisdiction of the government that enacted them, may be
upheld on the basis of their connection to a valid legislative scheme”.51
The leading authority on the ancillary powers doctrine is General Motors
of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing Ltd.52 There Dickson C.J.C.
announced a three-part test for assessing whether an “extra-jurisdictional
incursion”53 is severe enough to defeat the constitutional validity of the
impugned sections of an otherwise valid statute.54 The Court in General
Motors further directed that the severity of this extra-jurisdictional
incursion or “overflow” as it has come to be described55 dictated the
level of scrutiny to be applied in each particular case where the ancillary
powers doctrine is invoked. If the intrusion is minimal, a rational,
50

RAHRA, id., at paras. 89 to 122. Interestingly, she admits considerable reservations about
the scope of s. 10.
51
Id., at para. 126.
52
[1989] S.C.J. No. 28, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “General Motors”].
53
The term appears in McLachlin C.J.C.’s opinion in RAHRA, supra, note 6, at para. 128.
See also Quebec (Attorney General) v. Lacombe, [2010] S.C.J. No. 38, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 453, at para.
35 (S.C.C.), per McLachlin C.J.C.
54
Supra, note 52, at 666-69. The first step is to determine whether the impugned provision
intrudes on the other level of government’s powers; if so, the second step is to determine whether the
impugned provision is part of a valid legislative scheme; if so, the third step is to determine whether
the impugned provision is sufficiently integrated with that scheme. Id., at 666-67. See also Kitkatla
Band v. British Columbia (Minister of Small Business, Tourism and Culture), [2002] S.C.J. No. 33,
[2002] 2 S.C.R. 146, at para. 58 (S.C.C.), per LeBel J.; and Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings Inc., [2005]
S.C.J. No. 66, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 302, at para. 21 (S.C.C.), per LeBel J.
55
The term “overflow” has now become part of our constitutional lexicon after Canadian
Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). Justices LeBel and
Deschamps wrote in RAHRA, supra, note 6, at para. 188, that “[a]s a result of some clarifications
made in Canadian Western Bank, at para. 32, regarding the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity,
we now prefer — rather than speaking of an ‘encroachment’, as in General Motors, Kirkbi and
Kitkatla Band — to use the word ‘overflow’ when discussing the ancillary powers doctrine.”
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functional connection test is warranted; however, if the intrusion is
substantial, then a more stringent standard of necessity is demanded.
Applying these principles, McLachlin C.J.C. concluded that a standard of rational connection applied to the AHR Act since the impugned
provisions “constitute only a minor intrusion on provincial power”.56 She
offered three reasons for her conclusion. First, the competing heads of
provincial power–property and civil rights (section 92(13)), and matters
of a merely local or private nature (section 92(16)), are broad with the
consequence that any intrusion by a federal statute into these particular
heads of provincial legislative power is by definition less serious and
more tolerable.57 Second, the impugned sections relate to administration
and enforcement of the AHR Act. Consequently, they touch upon only “a
small corner of the vast topography of the provincial power over health:
namely, the harmful aspects of assisted human reproduction”.58 Third,
history appears to support legislation of this kind, as “Parliament has
long sought to address issues of morality, health and security” through
the criminal law power.59
One of the criticisms levelled against the General Motors “severity
of the intrusion test” is that it is overly subjective, and malleable enough
to accommodate the jurisprudential preferences of the reviewing court.60
Indeed, once the operative test is identified, the die is usually cast in
most cases. Since McLachlin C.J.C. had already ruled that morality was
the predominant criminal law objective sought to be advanced by the
AHR Act with public health being relegated to a peripheral role, it was
not too difficult to deduce that any invasion of provincial legislative
jurisdiction over health very likely will be viewed as minimal.61 As a
consequence, the information and access to information provisions in
sections 14 to 19 satisfied the rational connection standard because
“[f]unctionally, they fill gaps that would otherwise undermine the
56

RAHRA, id., at para. 136.
Id., at para. 134.
58
Id., at para. 135.
59
Id., at para. 136.
60
See, e.g., Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law in Canada, looseleaf (Scarborough, ON:
Carswell), at 15-43. Chief Justice McLachlin acknowledged Hogg’s concern but asserted that it need
not be determined in this Reference: supra, note 6, at para. 127.
61
In coming to this conclusion, McLachlin C.J.C. made no reference to the important intervention filed by Dr. Michael Awad, a medical doctor trained in assisted human reproductive
technologies and licensed to practice in this area of medicine by the College of Physicians and
Surgeons of Alberta but who was unable to obtain a licence under the AHR Act: see note 78, infra.
57
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operation of the prohibition regime.”62 For similar reasons, the various
organizational, administrative and enforcement provisions found in the
statute were sustained as they assisted the proper functioning of the
legislative scheme.63
2. The Joint Opinion of Justices LeBel and Deschamps
Justices LeBel and Deschamps came to the opposite conclusion arrived at by McLachlin C.J.C. They ruled that apart from a handful of
absolute prohibitions, the pith and substance of the balance of the AHR
Act is the regulation of assisted reproduction technologies as a public
health service. These matters more properly were anchored in provincial
heads of power in relation to the management of hospitals (subsection
92(7)); to “essential aspects of the relationship between a physician and
persons who require assistance of reproduction”,64 and to the practice of
medicine,65 all matters traditionally regulated under sections 92(13) and
92(16) of the Constitution Act, 1867. Indeed, the AHR Act intruded so
significantly into such areas of exclusive provincial legislative jurisdiction it could not be sustained under the ancillary powers doctrine. Their
philosophical approach to federalism differs starkly from McLachlin
C.J.C.’s, and informs the whole of their analysis of the division of
powers issues presented in RAHRA.
They began their judgment by underscoring the primacy of the federal principle throughout the division of powers analysis. In Reference re
Secession of Quebec,66 the Supreme Court identified federalism as a
fundamental organizing principle informing constitutional interpretation
and the “lodestar by which the courts have been guided”.67 For LeBel
and Deschamps JJ. this principle means “the powers of the different
levels of government in a federation are co-ordinate, not subordinate,
powers”, and if functioning correctly “a government does not encroach
on the powers of the other level of government.”68 An element of the
federal principle to which they ascribe great relevance is the principle of
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

RAHRA, supra, note 6, at para. 141.
Id., at paras. 147-151.
Id., at para. 265.
Id., at para. 266.
[1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.).
Id., at para. 56.
RAHRA, supra, note 6, at para. 182.
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subsidiarity which holds that “legislative action is to be taken by the
government that is closest to the citizen and is thus considered to be in
the best position to respond to the citizen’s concerns.”69 These unwritten
principles gain heightened significance when expansive heads of federal
or provincial legislative power are engaged as they help “to maintain the
constitutional balance of powers at all stages of the constitutional
analysis”.70
Like McLachlin C.J.C., LeBel and Deschamps JJ. believed RAHRA’s
ultimate result turned in large measure on the application of the ancillary
powers doctrine.71 At the same time, they did not follow her loose
approach to the pith and substance inquiry. Rather, LeBel and
Deschamps JJ. advocated a rigorous pith and substance analysis particularly in disputes where capacious federal and provincial heads of legislative power like criminal law and procedure (section 91(27)), and
property and civil rights in the province (section 92(13)) are in tension.
They explained why such rigour is warranted:
It is important to identify the pith and substance of the impugned
provisions as precisely as possible. A vague or general characterization
of the pith and substance could have perverse effects on more that one
level: first on the connection with an exclusive power and then on the
extent of the overflow. For example, a finding that a provision is in pith
and substance in relation to health or to the environment would be
problematic. Those subjects are so vast and have so many aspects that,
depending on the angle from which they are approached, they can
support the exercise of legislative powers of either level of government.
It is therefore necessary to take the analysis further and determine what
aspect of the field in question is being addressed … The identification
of the pith and substance of a provision or a statute is therefore subject
to the same requirement of precision as the identification of the purpose
of a provision establishing a limit in the context of the infringement of
a right in an analysis under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. In both cases, properly identifying the purpose forms the
cornerstone of the analysis … If vague characterizations of the pith and
69
Id. The relevance of the doctrine of subsidiarity to the analysis is discussed more fully by
Eugénie Brouillet, “Canadian Federalism and the Principle of Subsidiarity: Should We Open
Pandora’s Box?” in J. Cameron & B. Ryder, eds. (2011) 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 601. For another view
about the doctrine’s relevance in division of powers analysis, see Dwight Newman, “Changing
Division of Powers Doctrine and the Emergent Principle of Subsidiarity” (2011) 74 Sask. L. Rev.
21, at 26ff.
70
RAHRA, id., at para. 196.
71
Id., at para. 267.
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substance of provisions were accepted, this could lead not only to the
dilution of and confusion with respect to the constitutional doctrines
that have been developed over the years, but also to an erosion of the
scope of provincial powers as a result of the federal paramountcy
doctrine.
In sum, the need for precision in characterizing the pith and
substance of a statute or a provision assumes greater importance where
a connection must be made with a power whose limits are imprecise. In
the event of uncertainty, it becomes necessary to turn to the broader,
unwritten rules that serve as the basis of and provide a framework for
Canadian federalism[.]72

When attempting to characterize the AHR Act’s purpose, LeBel and
Deschamps JJ. took into account its legislative text and context. For them,
this included having regard to the Final Report of the Baird Commission.
Despite McLachlin C.J.C.’s overt criticism of their approach73 LeBel and
Deschamps JJ. concluded that the statute’s architecture — comprised of
prohibited activities and controlled activities — demonstrates that Parliament “adopted the two recommendations of the Baird Commission
unconditionally”.74 In addition, they noted that medical research had
rapidly evolved since the release of the Commission’s Report with the
result assisted human reproductive technologies no longer are viewed as “a
social ‘evil’”.75 Instead, they represent “a form of scientific progress that is
of great value to individuals dealing with infertility problems”.76 For LeBel
and Deschamps JJ. the legislative purpose animating the AHR Act was not
predominantly to control a matter of public morality as found by McLachlin C.J.C. Only the absolute prohibitions could be characterized in this
way. Instead, their analysis led them to opine that the bulk of the AHR Act
pertained to the regulation of medical research, health professionals and
the provisions of health services.
These judges discovered that a careful assessment of the effects of the
impugned provisions particularly those relating to controlled activities of the
72
Id., at paras. 190-191 (citations omitted). For a most illuminating discussion of the importance of identifying a legislative objective with precision for the purposes of s. 1 analysis, see
Reference re Saskatchewan (Marriage Act, Marriage Commissioners), [2011] S.J. No. 3, [2011] 3
W.W.R. 193, at paras. 110-153 (Sask. C.A.), per Smith J.A. (Vancise J.A. concurring).
73
RAHRA, id., at para. 29. (“The Baird Commission was writing a policy analysis (not a
constitutional law paper), on a subject thought to raise serious issues of morality.”)
74
Id., at para. 210.
75
Id., at para. 212.
76
Id., at para. 213.
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AHR Act substantiated their characterization of its legislative purpose.
Many of these provisions, they determined, seriously interfere with the
practice of medicine. In particular, they cited the consent provision in
section 8 as having a “direct impact on the relationship between physicians called upon to use assisted reproductive technologies, donors, and
patients”,77 and the various sections which “require researchers and
physicians who engage in activities related to treatments for infertility to
obtain licences” from the Agency, activities traditionally falling within
provincial legislative jurisdiction.78 Their examination of the AHR Act in
keeping with the rigorous inquiry necessary to identify the pith and
substance which they advocated at the outset of their joint opinion led
them to conclude:
[T]he purpose and effects of the provisions in question relate to the
regulation of a specific type of health services provided in health-care
institutions by health-care professionals to individuals who for
pathological or physiological reasons need help to reproduce. Their pith
and substance must be characterized as the regulation of assisted
human reproduction as a health service.79

Justices LeBel and Deschamps’ characterization of the AHR Act’s
pith and substance as being in relation to public health services manifested a significant disagreement with McLachlin C.J.C.’s philosophical
approach to the pith and substance inquiry. These judges acknowledged
that federal legislative action based upon morality can be a legitimate
exercise of the criminal law power. At the same time, they cautioned that
“care must be taken not to view every social, economic or scientific issue
as a moral problem.”80 In their view, McLachlin C.J.C.’s overly deferential acceptance of the federal government’s defence of the AHR Act as a
public morality measure meant Parliament only had to demonstrate “a
77

Id., at para. 220.
Id., at para. 221. The effect of these requirements is that qualified medical practitioners
could not practice assisted reproductive technologies if they did not possess a licence issued under
the AHR Act, a reality attested to by Dr. Michael Awad, who filed a personal intervention in this
Reference: Factum of the Intervener, Michael Awad (on file with author). Paragraph 2 outlines
Dr. Awad’s dilemma as follows:
Dr. Awad is a physician in Red Deer, Alberta. He has undertaken intensive training in the
area of in vitro fertilization (“IVF”), following 11 years experience as a specialist obstetrician and gynecologist. He is unable to pursue this practice because of the requirement that
he obtain a licence under the [AHR Act], pursuant to regulations that currently do not exist.
Not one of the three opinions rendered in RAHRA referred to Dr. Awad’s important intervention.
79
Id., at para. 227 (emphasis added).
80
Id., at para. 239.
78
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reasonable basis to expect that its legislation will address a concern of
fundamental importance”81 for it to succeed. Were this the accepted
standard for federalism purposes, it would extend the criminal law power
to the point it could evade effective judicial review, and jeopardize “the
constitutional balance of the federal-provincial division of powers”.82
For LeBel and Deschamps JJ. more rigour needed to be brought to
the pith and substance inquiry not only in the characterization of the
AHR Act’s purpose but also in considering whether it could be allocated
to the criminal law power. They noted that when dealing with legislation
in relation to the protection of public health, courts, generally speaking,
have been less deferential to Parliament’s reliance on the criminal law
power if the public health risk sought to be regulated “could not be easily
demonstrated”83 through empirically-based scientific research. For
example, well documented and devastating health risks associated with
tobacco consumption supported the extensive regulation of tobacco
advertising under section 91(27) in RJR-MacDonald84 while the failure
to establish a clear link between the use of margarine and human disease
defeated the law at issue in the Margarine Reference.85 Rigorous scrutiny
is warranted because criminal laws motivated by public health concerns
invariably intrude some distance onto provincial legislative jurisdiction
over health related matters.
The wide-ranging regulation of assisted reproductive technologies
found in the AHR Act lacked such linkages. Indeed, certain technologies
such as artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization have now been
added to the list of basic services underwritten by the public health
insurance plans of provinces like Ontario and Quebec.86 Justices LeBel
and Deschamps concluded that assisted human reproduction is not “an
evil needing to be suppressed”; rather, it “is a burgeoning field of
medical practice and research that, as Parliament mentions in s. 2 of the
81

Id., at para. 238
Id., at para. 239.
Id., at para. 241.
84
Supra, note 34.
85
Supra, note 42.
86
RAHRA, supra, note 6, at paras. 248-251. Not all provinces include such services as part
of their provincial health insurance scheme, however. It has been concluded that a government’s
decision not to underwrite assisted reproductive technologies from the public treasury does not
violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]): see Cameron v.
Nova Scotia (Attorney General), [1999] N.S.J. No. 297, 177 D.L.R. (4th) 611 (N.S.C.A.), leave to
appeal refused [2000] 1 S.C.R. vii (S.C.C.).
82
83
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AHR Act, brings benefits to many Canadians”.87 They accept that many
of the new and emerging assisted human reproduction technologies
qualify as novel. However, this reality cannot justify extensive regulation
by the federal government under the criminal law power, otherwise
“nearly every new medical technology could be brought within federal
jurisdiction.”88
The various types of matters which the Supreme Court has permitted
to be regulated under section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867 fulfil a
typical criminal public purpose.89 These include tobacco advertising,90
the emission of toxic substances into the environment,91 and the improper
use of firearms,92 all of which are activities which can threaten public
health and safety. Even abortion which until 1988 had been closely
regulated under the Criminal Code had a lengthy historical pedigree as a
criminal law measure.93 In contrast, assisted human reproduction
technologies are neither obviously harmful to public health nor historically subject to regulation under the criminal law. Apart from the
absolute prohibitions against the most reprehensible technologies, the
balance of the AHR Act strayed far afield from the traditional subject
matters of the criminal law.
Despite the “overflow of the exercise of the federal criminal law
power”94 occasioned by the impugned sections, LeBel and Deschamps
JJ. were prepared to consider whether it may be possible to salvage some
or all of them through the operation of the ancillary powers doctrine.
Ultimately, however, they concluded that the ancillary powers doctrine
did not apply in these circumstances. To begin, they held that the
seriousness of the overflow into areas of provincial legislative jurisdiction occasioned by the AHR Act required the federal government to
demonstrate “the impugned provisions have a relationship of necessity”95
87

RAHRA, id., at para. 251.
Id., at para. 256.
89
Id., at para. 237.
90
RJR-Macdonald, supra, note 34.
91
Hydro-Québec, supra, note 2.
92
Firearms Reference, supra, note 3.
93
See, e.g., R. v. Morgentaler (No. 2), [1993] S.C.J. No. 95, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463, at 491
(S.C.C.), per Sopinka J. (“As early as the mid-nineteenth century, with the adoption of legislation
imitating Lord Ellensborough’s Act (U.K.), 43 Geo. 3, c. 58, through the time of Confederation and
up to the 1969 amendments to the Criminal Code … the criminal law in Canada prohibited abortions
with penal consequences”.)
94
RAHRA, supra, note 6, at para. 267.
95
Id., at para. 275.
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and not simply a functional connection with those sections found or
conceded to be constitutional.
They reasoned that this high standard could not be satisfied principally for two reasons. First, since the absolute prohibitions found in the
AHR Act did not depend upon its extensive regulatory scheme to be
effective, any connection between the prohibitory and regulatory aspects
of the statute is “artificial”.96 The prohibitions covered those assisted
reproductive technologies Parliament deemed to be reprehensible while
the regulatory aspects pertained to processes and technologies deemed to
be legitimate. The AHR Act amounted to an impermissible commingling
of “provisions falling within provincial jurisdiction with others that in
fact relate to the criminal law”.97 Second, the legislative history of the
AHR Act but also the history of regulating medical procedures related to
assisted human reproduction did not connect the impugned provisions to
the criminal law. Accordingly, all of the impugned sections containing
the regulatory as opposed to the prohibitory framework of the AHR Act
were declared ultra vires Parliament.
Justices LeBel and Deschamps’ approach is consistent with the Supreme Court’s direction in Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta98 that for
federalism purposes when the content of a particular statute overflows
into the legislative jurisdiction of the other level of government, “a firm
application of the pith and substance analysis” is warranted because the
“scale of the alleged incidental effects may indeed put a law in a different
light so as to place it in another constitutional head of power.”99 This is
exactly what these judges discovered as they analyzed the impugned
aspects of the AHR Act, namely, provisions which on their face appear to
operate as exceptions to criminal prohibitions are revealed as sections
extensively regulating matters falling within provincial heads of power.

96

Id., at para. 278.
Id., citing Scowby v. Glendinning, [1986] S.C.J. No. 57, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 226 (S.C.C.), in
support of this proposition.
98
Supra, note 55.
99
Id., at para. 31 (emphasis added).
97
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3. The Opinion of Justice Cromwell
Justice Cromwell’s brief opinion serves as the “tie-breaker” in
RAHRA.100 Although at times his reasoning borders on the Delphic, it is
apparent his ultimate conclusion is driven by his considered assessment
of the integration of the regulatory aspects of the AHR Act with its
purely prohibitory, and by definition criminal, aspects. At bottom, he
views RAHRA as testing the limits of the criminal law power’s regulatory
function. Indeed, he characterizes the central issue this way: “The main
question, as I see it, is whether the federal criminal law power permits
Parliament to regulate virtually all aspects of research and clinical
practice in relation to assisted human reproduction.”101
Respecting the pith and substance analysis, Cromwell J. characterized the AHR Act in a manner far more devastating to the Government of
Canada than did the other judges. He aligned himself squarely with the
Quebec Court of Appeal’s characterization of the AHR Act102 which
“goes far beyond”103 the characterization of this legislation identified by
LeBel and Deschamps JJ., namely, regulating assisted human reproduction as a public health service. In Cromwell J.’s assessment the intensely
regulatory aspects of the statute constitute “minute regulation of every
aspect of research and clinical practice” and are “best classified as being
in relation to three areas of exclusive provincial legislative competence:
the establishment, maintenance and management of hospitals [section
92(7)]; property and civil rights in the province [section 92(13)]; and
100
For an elaborate and provocative analysis of law, adjudication and judges as tie breakers
in a democratic society, see Adam M. Samaha, “On Law’s Tiebreakers” (2010) 77 U. Chicago L.
Rev. 1661, esp. at 1717-37.
101
Supra, note 6, at para. 283.
102
Id., at para. 285. Justice Cromwell specifically referred to paras. 121-122 of the Quebec
Court of Appeal’s judgment in RAHRA. In those paragraphs the lower court stated:
With respect to everything that is not subject to a total prohibition, the [AHR Act] constitutes a complete code governing all clinical and research activities relating to assisted
reproduction. In fact Parliament first of all empowers the government to regulate more than
25 areas of activity related to assisted reproduction … It then creates the Agency, on which it
confers the double mandate of qualifying and licensing establishments and persons involved
in assisted reproduction activities … and of overseeing the application of the Act.
…..

This short and simplified summary of the Act reveals the legislative intent is to cover
the entire field of assisted reproduction, with respect to both clinical practice and research. In this respect, the Act may be characterized as comprehensive and exhaustive
legislation on the subject, just as the Baird Commission wished.
Quebec Reference, supra, note 12, at paras. 121-122 (emphasis added).
103
RAHRA, supra, note 6, at para. 286.
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matters of a merely local or private nature in the province [section
92(16)]”.104 As a consequence, he concludes that the various impugned
sections of the AHR Act do not further any criminal law purpose currently recognized by the Supreme Court’s section 91(27)’s jurisprudence.
It is at this point where Cromwell J.’s reasoning becomes somewhat
obscure. While he finds no criminal law purpose being advanced by the
impugned sections collectively, he accepts that certain specific provisions
“to the extent that they relate to provisions of the [AHR Act], which are
constitutional, were properly enacted by Parliament in accordance with
the federal criminal law power”.105 It is not entirely apparent, however,
on what he bases his conclusion. Is it because these particular sections
fall within the criminal law power’s regulatory capacity and, therefore,
qualify as being validly enacted under section 91(27)? Or are they
legitimated through the application of the ancillary powers doctrine by
virtue of the strength of their connection to provisions of the AHR Act
validly enacted pursuant to section 91(27)?
Close scrutiny reveals that Cromwell J. employed both bases depending on the nature of the particular provision at issue. While Cromwell J.’s philosophical approach to the division of powers issue is more
compatible with that of LeBel and Deschamps JJ., he appears more
willing than they to afford greater scope to the operation of both the
criminal law power and the ancillary powers doctrine than his Quebec
colleagues.
First, he accepted that a handful of the impugned sections either fall
within the traditional boundaries of the criminal law or function as
exceptions to criminal prohibitions set out in the AHR Act the constitutionality of which were not impugned. These included provisions relating
to consent and age of consent found in sections 8 and 9, matters often
addressed by the criminal law in other contexts.106 While not a traditional
criminal law measure, the exception for certain commercial activities set
out in section 12 serves as “a form of exemption ... and to some extent,
defines the scope of the prohibitions” on the commercialization of
reproductive functions set out in sections 6 and 7 of the statute.107 These
particular provisions though they incidentally affect matters falling
within provincial legislative authority can be classified as relating to
104
105
106
107

Id., at para. 287.
Id., at para. 292.
Id., at para. 289.
Id., at para. 290.
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matters falling within the traditional domain of the criminal law. For this
reason, Cromwell J. concludes they are validly enacted pursuant to
section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867.
To sustain certain of the other impugned provisions, Cromwell J.
appeared to apply the ancillary powers doctrine without expressly
identifying that he is doing so. Instead, he was content to reference it
indirectly by citing two of its foundational precedents.108 His cryptic
application of this doctrine leaves certain questions unanswered not the
least of which is by what standard does he measure how the doctrine is to
be assessed: the functional connection standard or the necessity standard? In view of his strongly expressed conclusion that the impugned
sections intrude or overflow significantly into matters strongly anchored
in areas of exclusive provincial legislative jurisdiction, it is possible to
surmise that he, like LeBel and Deschamps JJ., applied a test of necessity. Justice Cromwell underscored that the licensing, inspection and
enforcement provisions are constitutionally acceptable provided their
operation is tied directly to those sections of the AHR Act which are
valid exercises of the criminal law power. Regulatory provisions of this
kind are needed to facilitate the smooth operation of the prohibitions; yet,
there must be a close and direct connection between the regulatory and
prohibitory sections.
In view of its pivotal importance to the outcome of RAHRA, not to
mention its significance to the doctrinal evolution of section 91(27) of
the Constitution Act, 1867, it is unfortunate that Cromwell J. was not
more expansive in setting forth his reasoning in his short opinion. As a
result, one is left to divine much of his intent. At the same time, however,
it cannot be denied he is uncomfortable with the relaxed approach toward
the elasticity of the criminal law power embraced by McLachlin C.J.C.
and her allies. While Cromwell J. accepts some regulatory capacity in the
contemporary interpretation criminal law power, he sees keenly the need
to maintain the constitutional balance of legislative powers requiring
firm limitations upon its evolution. He is assiduous in ensuring section
91(27) does not by stealth emerge as a general regulatory power for
Parliament.

108
Id., at para. 288. These two precedents are: Canada (Attorney General) v. Canadian
National Transportation Ltd., [1983] S.C.J. No. 73, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 206 (S.C.C.), and General
Motors, supra, note 52.

(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) NOT A GENERAL REGULATORY POWER

657

IV. ANALYSIS
No other head of federal legislative power in the Constitution Act,
1867 is potentially as capacious as section 91(27). As a consequence, its
loose application would swallow up much of provincial legislative
jurisdiction and disrupt the division of federal and provincial legislative
powers. Unfortunately, what qualifies as valid criminal law is often
difficult to discern. “Criminal law is easier to recognize than to define,”
Estey J. observed in Scowby v. Glendinning;109 “[i]t is easier to say what
is not criminal law than what is.”110 This lack of clarity means the
Supreme Court must be vigilant and place limits upon the emerging
contemporary trend to expand the criminal law power since “a limitless
definition, combined with the doctrine of paramountcy, has the potential
to upset the constitutional balance of federal-provincial powers.”111
Historically, the jurisprudential debate centred on how to define
criminal acts. In more recent times, particularly in the final decades of
the 20th century the focus of this debate has shifted from assessing what
constitutes a valid criminal law purpose and by extension what may
qualify as a crime, to how far is the reach of the criminal law power’s
regulatory function. At least since 1924 and the Privy Council’s ruling in
Ontario (Attorney General) v. Reciprocal Insurers112 it has been generally accepted that Parliament cannot through the formal mechanism of a
criminal offence, namely, the creation of a prohibition coupled with a
penalty, purport to regulate matters falling squarely within provincial
legislative jurisdiction. Justice Duff (as he then was) writing for the
Judicial Committee in that appeal stated that “to hold otherwise would be
incompatible with an essential principle of the Confederation scheme, the
object of which … was ‘not to weld the Provinces into one or to subordinate

109

Supra, note 97.
Id., at 236. Chief Justice McLachlin makes a similar observation in her opinion in
RAHRA, supra, note 6, at paras. 40-43 (“Much judicial ink has been spilled in attempting to
elucidate a precise definition of a valid criminal law purpose.”)
111
RAHRA, id., at para. 43, per McLachlin C.J.C. A good example of where the Supreme
Court has previously put the brakes to a limitless criminalization of conduct is R. v. Boggs, [1981]
S.C.J. No. 6, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 49 (S.C.C.). There, Estey J. struck down certain provisions of the
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, that attached criminal consequences to driving offences under
provincial law, conduct unrelated to any criminal offence.
112
[1924] A.C. 328 (P.C.).
110
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the Provincial Governments to a central authority’.”113 In other words,
this would offend the federal principle.
Over the decades courts began to shed this minimalist view of a regulatory function for the criminal law power. In particular under the guise of
section 91(27), the Supreme Court tolerated the creation of exemptions
from criminal prohibitions because they provide to Parliament some
flexibility in defining the prohibited conduct and designing the criminal
offence.114 Yet, the power to create exemptions had to be ancillary to the
prohibition which after all is the primary function of the criminal law. If,
however, exemptions and dispensations overwhelmed the prohibitions, and
the offence provisions proved incidental to the enforcement of social
norms, the law’s essence or dominant purpose is regulatory in nature and
not criminal. Activities which are not per se criminal in nature or are
otherwise exempt from the taint of criminality should not be regulated by
Parliament under section 91(27), unless a jurisdictional source can be
located in another head of federal legislative power.115
In spite of this earlier history which accepted a restricted regulatory
role for the criminal law power, the Supreme Court more recently has
approved of highly intrusive and sweeping regulatory measures as legitimate exercises of the criminal law power. For example, in HydroQuébec116 an elaborate regulatory mechanism created under the Canadian
Environmental Protection Act117 for identifying toxic substances was
sustained on the basis that Part II of this statute prohibited through penal
sanction the unauthorized use of those substances. The most recent
example of a robust regulatory regime being sustained under section
91(27) is the Firearms Reference.118 There the Firearms Act established
licensing and registration requirements for all firearms, including rifles
and shotguns. The Supreme Court in an unattributed opinion accepted
113
Id., at 342-43 (citations omitted), quoting Lord Watson in Maritime Bank of Canada v.
Receiver General of New Brunswick, [1892] A.C. 437, at 441 (P.C.).
114
See especially: R. v. Morgentaler, [1975] S.C.J. No. 48, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 616 (S.C.C.); R.
v. Furtney, [1991] S.C.J. No. 70, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 89 (S.C.C.), and RJR-MacDonald, supra, note 34.
115
See, e.g., Furtney, id., at 103, and Horsemen’s Benevolent & Protective Assn. of Alberta
v. Alberta (Racing Commission), [1989] A.J. No. 1151, 63 D.L.R. (4th) 609, at 615-17 (Alta. C.A.),
leave to appeal refused, [1990] 1 S.C.R. viii (S.C.C.).
116
Supra, note 2. It should be recalled that the result achieved in Hydro-Québec was razorthin (5-4). Justice La Forest (L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Cory and MacLachlin JJ. concurring)
wrote for the majority upholding the impugned legislation. Chief Justice Lamer and Iacobucci J.
(Sopinka and Major JJ. concurring) filed a joint opinion declaring it ultra vires Parliament.
117
R.S.C. 1985, c. 16 (4th Supp.).
118
Supra, note 3.
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that “[g]un control has traditionally been considered valid criminal law
because guns are dangerous and pose a risk to public safety.”119 As a
result, the Court ruled the impugned statute fulfilled a valid criminal law
purpose. In both cases, however, it might be said that the tail appeared to
be wagging the dog!
This brief chronology underscores why many constitutional lawyers
consider RAHRA to be such a significant case. The AHR Act is predominantly a regulatory statute pertaining to subject matters generally
understood as falling within exclusive provincial legislative jurisdiction.
Previously, Parliament had not sought to employ the criminal law power
to regulate so pervasively matters such as medical research, medical
procedures or the medical profession. To be sure, it may be laudable to
establish national benchmarks for the provision of assisted reproductive
technologies. The Baird Commission fervently desired such a result. Yet,
pan-Canadian norms in the provision of health care services and healthrelated matters have to be achieved with regard to well-established
principles regarding the constitutional division of federal and provincial
legislative powers. The majority of the Supreme Court in RAHRA is
surely correct when it states that recourse to section 91(27) cannot “be
based solely on concerns for efficiency and consistency, as such concerns, viewed in isolation, do not fall under the criminal law”.120
The judicial push back in RAHRA to Parliament’s attempt in the
AHR Act to expand yet again section 91(27)’s regulatory capacity was
achieved principally through the majority’s approach to the characterization function of the pith and substance inquiry and the ancillary powers
doctrine. Together, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of these two
principles of constitutional analysis reveals that not only must boundaries
on the regulatory aspect be established but also at the moment these
boundaries seem fragile and may depend upon the philosophical proclivities of reviewing judges.
The fragility of the Supreme Court’s boundary setting in RAHRA is
best illustrated by the differences in the characterization analysis undertaken in all three judgments. Chief Justice McLachlin identified morality
as the dominant purpose of the AHR Act with health and security of the
person as being secondary. Justices LeBel and Deschamps selected the
provision of public health services as the core-subject matter addressed
119
120

Id., at 804, para. 33.
Supra, note 6, at para. 244, per LeBel and Deschamps JJ., and at para. 287, per Cromwell J.
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by the impugned provisions. Justice Cromwell went even farther determining that the impugned sections purported to regulate all manner of
medical research and clinical practice in relation to assisted reproductive
technologies. The reason for the stark discrepancy between these judges
when characterizing the dominant legislative purpose of the legislation is
exemplified by McLachlin C.J.C.’s relaxed approach to the task of
characterizing the legislation’s objective. An important element of
RAHRA is the discipline which LeBel and Deschamps JJ. advocate is
necessary when ascertaining an impugned law’s pith and substance
generally, but especially when Parliament seeks to sustain a law under
the criminal law power. Their joint opinion is important because a
majority of the Supreme Court has again directed that the characterization exercise is a rigorous one and if undertaken properly should avoid
vague or overly broad characterizations particularly in the context of
general heads of legislative power.121 It is exceptional because for the
first time in federalism jurisprudence a majority analogized this task to
identifying a legislative objective for purposes of section 1 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,122 a potentially groundbreaking doctrinal shift.
In RAHRA, the dominant purpose or aspect each judge identified for
the AHR Act in effect determined the outcome of their division of
powers analysis. For McLachlin C.J.C. the selection of public morality
meant that the health related aspects of the impugned provisions were
purely incidental and their overflow into provincial legislative authority
deemed minimal. For the other five judges, the selection of health
regulation as the dominant objective123 firmly anchored the pith and
substance of the impugned provisions in provincial legislative jurisdiction. It followed that these significant regulatory aspects of the AHR Act
could only be sustained if it could be demonstrated these were needed to
ensure the proper functioning of the statute as a whole. Disagreement
emerged among those judges, however, about which of the impugned
sections could be described as essential. For purposes of my thesis the
source of this disagreement is not important. Rather, what is significant is
that five members of the Court employed a stringent pith and substance
121

See especially Canadian Western Bank, supra, notes 98 and 99 and accompanying text.
Supra, note 86.
123
This characterization extended in Cromwell J.’s formulation to “virtually every aspect of
research and clinical practice in relation to assisted human reproduction”: RAHRA, supra, note 6, at
para. 285.
122
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analysis together with a strict application of the ancillary powers doctrine
to cabin excessive regulation under the guise of section 91(27) of the
Constitution Act, 1867 of matters falling squarely within section 92.
To be sure, the close result achieved in RAHRA means it will be necessary to await other division of powers rulings from the Supreme Court
to assess whether this judgment does mark a watershed in federalism
analysis. It is apparent that certain judges have grown concerned, even
alarmed about the growing regulatory function with which Parliament
continues to imbue the criminal law power. This is an encouraging signal
for those worried by the subtle yet real shift in the constitutional balance
of powers between the national and provincial governments achieved
through section 91(27). Indeed, it has already made its presence felt in
lower courts. For example, very recently RAHRA influenced the analysis
of the Alberta Court of Appeal in Reference re Securities Act (Canada)124
to hold that widespread economic regulation such as that contemplated in
the proposed Canadian Securities Act125 could not be attained under
section 91(27) because it is too far removed from traditional criminal law
purposes of prohibiting and sanctioning fraudulent conduct.126
The next opportunity for the Supreme Court to test the durability of
the federalism analysis advocated in RAHRA will be Reference re
Canadian Securities Act (Can.).127 There the Court must decide if the
proposed Canadian Securities Act is a valid exercise of Parliament’s
jurisdiction to legislate under the trade and commerce power located in
section 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867. The draft federal statute
emulates, if not entirely duplicates, many aspects of existing and constitutionally valid provincial securities laws. To be sure, in contrast to its
American counterpart128 the elasticity of the Canadian trade and com124

[2011] S.J. No. 228, 332 D.L.R. (4th) 697 (Alta. C.A.).
R.S.A. 2000, c. S-4.
126
Supra, note 124, at paras. 31-32, per Slatter J.A. for the Court. On March 31, 2011, the
Quebec Court of Appeal (Dalphond J.A., dissenting) also declared the Proposed Canadian Securities Act
ultra vires Parliament: see Quebec (Procureure générale) c. Canada (Procureure générale), [2011] J.Q.
no 2940, 2011 QCCA 591 (Que. C.A.). Indeed, the plurality of Forget, Bich and Bouchard JJ.A. relied
heavily on RAHRA in their pith and substance analysis: see Quebec (Procureure générale) c. Canada
(Procureure générale), id., especially at paras. 236, 238, 239 and 297.
127
S.C.C. No. 33718. This reference is currently under reserve following the hearing before
the Supreme Court of Canada on April 13 and 14, 2011.
128
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution provides in part that Congress shall
have the power “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes.” For an important recent case on the Commerce Clause, see: United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), in which the United States Supreme
125
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merce power has not been truly tested. While section 91(2) engages
different considerations than the criminal law power, its potential to
overflow significantly into areas of exclusive provincial legislative
jurisdiction cannot be underestimated. Unbridled it would devastate the
current balance of constitutional powers in relation to financial regulation in Canada. I refrain from elaborating further on this subject here
except to say a wholesale endorsement of the draft federal legislation by
the Supreme Court would be a not-too-subtle signal that in the 21st
century, Canada’s federal structure is outmoded and no longer capable of
regulating satisfactorily economic matters in a globalized world.

V. WHAT’S NEXT? — FUTURE HEALTH REGULATION AND
REGULATION OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES
In light of the AHR Act’s troubled history, not to mention that of its
antecedents, the result in RAHRA may be viewed as a final blow to
achieving national regulatory standards in relation to assisted reproductive technologies. Such pessimism is unwarranted. Nothing in RAHRA
forbids the continued but careful use of the criminal law to regulate
certain aspects of health related matters nor does it foreclose panCanadian regulation of assisted reproductive technologies. This Part will
discuss the future implications of RAHRA both as they pertain to health
regulation generally and to the regulation of assisted reproductive
technologies particularly.
1. Health Regulation Generally
To be sure, section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867 has accommodated regulation of health-related matters provided it seeks to secure
the “physical health and safety of the public”.129 Such regulation is
tolerated when the laws in question, for example, pertain to the safety of
the food supply;130 false or misleading descriptions of products,131 or
Court (5-4) invalidated a federal law prohibiting individuals from carrying firearms near any school
in the nation.
129
R. v. Wetmore (County Court Judge), [1983] S.C.J. No. 74, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 284, at 288
(S.C.C.), per Laskin C.J. [hereinafter “Wetmore”].
130
See, e.g., Standard Sausage Co. v. Lee, [1933] B.C.J. No. 79, [1934] 1 W.W.R. 81
(B.C.C.A.), and Saputo Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] F.C.J. No. 291, 2011 FCA 69
(F.C.A.). But see: Margarine Reference, supra, note 42, where the Supreme Court ruled as ultra

(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) NOT A GENERAL REGULATORY POWER

663

hazardous materials available for public consumption.132 Yet, the Supreme Court declined to interpret section 91(27) so expansively as to
accommodate wholesale regulation of the production and distribution of
particular foods or drugs absent evidence those substances may be
hazardous to health.133
Despite constraints placed by these authorities upon the reach of section 91(27) to regulate health-related matters the federal government has
continued to employ the criminal law power for purposes of creating
increasingly extensive medical regulatory regimes. A recent case involving such far-reaching regulation is Apotex Inc. v. Canada (Minister of
Health); Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Assn. v. Canada (Minister of
Health).134 Apotex Inc. and the Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical
Association jointly attacked the Data Protection Regulation (“DPR”) of
the Regulations Respecting Food and Drug135 which created an eightyear period of exclusivity for the manufacturers of innovative drugs by
imposing a moratorium on the marketing of all generic copies of drugs
previously approved by Health Canada. The impugned regulation had
been enacted by the federal government to comply with certain specific
data protection provisions of both NAFTA and the WTO Agreement. This
regulatory scheme contained a criminal prohibition against marketing a
new drug which did not enjoy Health Canada’s approval. Various
grounds of attack to the constitutionality of the DPR were advanced
including that it was ultra vires section 91(27) of the Constitution Act,
1867. The Federal Court of Canada ruled that the DPR did not qualify as
criminal law but its constitutionality could be sustained under the trade
and commerce power.136 The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed a
subsequent appeal but disagreed with the lower court about which
particular head of federal legislative power supported the DPR’s constitutionality. This Court concluded unanimously that the DPR was valid
vires s. 91(27) a prohibition against the sale of margarine not made from milk or cream found in the
Dairy Industry Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 45.
131
Wetmore, supra, note 129.
132
R. v. Cosman’s Furniture (1972) Ltd., [1976] M.J. No. 97, 77 D.L.R. (3d) 312 (Man.
C.A.) (upholding the Hazardous Products Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. H-3, as it purports to regulate to
infants’ cribs and cradles).
133
Labatt Brewing Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1979] S.C.J. No. 134, [1980] 1
S.C.R. 914, at 934 (S.C.C.), per Estey J. for the majority.
134
[2010] F.C.J. No. 1582, 2010 FCA 334 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter “Apotex Inc.”].
135
C.R.C., c. 870.
136
Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Assn. v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2009] F.C.J.
No. 938, 2009 FC 725 (F.C.), per Mandamin J.
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criminal law.137 Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Canada denied leave to
appeal.138
The Federal Court found the dominant objective of the DPR, namely,
the implementation of Canada’s international trade obligations, did not
further a valid criminal law purpose. The impugned regulations effectively granted an eight-year monopoly to large pharmaceutical companies which develop an innovative drug by imposing a lengthy
moratorium on approval of any generic form of such a drug. This had
“the overall effect of bestowing a commercial benefit to innovator drug
manufacturers rather than a safety benefit to the public”.139 The DPR
could not then be characterized as criminal law because it was not
“directed at a legitimate public health evil”.140
On appeal, the Federal Court of Appeal ruled that the DPR qualified
as criminal law and had been validly enacted by Parliament pursuant to
its authority under section 91(27). Justice Nadon who wrote for the Court
took issue with Mandamin J.’s characterization of the purpose of the
DPR. He described the “true purpose of the DPR” as ensuring “Canadians have reasonable access, at reasonable prices, to new, safe and
effective drugs”141 that will “protect the public from the sale of unsafe
and/or ineffective drugs while, at the same time, making sure that the
public has access to safe and effective drugs”.142 Characterized in this
loose fashion, Nadon J.A. upheld the DPR as a valid criminal law.
The Federal Court of Appeal’s judgment in Apotex Inc. preceded the
release of RAHRA by mere days; however, Nadon J.A.’s division of
powers analysis is inconsistent with the approach to federalism questions
advocated by the RAHRA majority. The judgments of LeBel and
Deschamps JJ., and of Cromwell J., call for close critical scrutiny of the
true objectives of impugned legislation particularly when the federal
government asserts it is necessary to secure public health and safety. The
137

Supra, note 134, per Nadon J.A. (Sharlow and Layden-Stevenson JJ.A. concurring).
Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court refused July 14, 2011: [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 53,
2011 CanLII 43416, and [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 54, 2011 CanLII 43415, per McLachlin C.J.C.,
Deschamps and Charron JJ. It is well known that the Supreme Court’s dismissal of a leave to appeal
application does not represent approval of the lower court’s reasoning: see, e.g, Des Champs v.
Conseil des écoles séparées catholiques de langue française de Prescott-Russell, [1999] S.C.J. No.
53, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 281, at para. 31 (S.C.C.), per Binnie J.; and R. v. Côté, [1977] S.C.J. No. 37,
[1978] 1 S.C.R. 8, at 16 (S.C.C.), per De Grandpré J.
139
Supra, note 136, at para. 73.
140
Id., at para. 77.
141
Apotex Inc., supra, note 134, at para. 114.
142
Id., at para. 122.
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(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) NOT A GENERAL REGULATORY POWER

665

fact that the overall legislative scheme fulfils a valid criminal law
purpose is not sufficient to legitimate a particular regulatory regime
enacted pursuant to that scheme. It may be the distribution of safe
patented drugs is a salutary side-effect of the DPR; however, it is
obviously not its dominant purpose. Here the public health objectives are
quite attenuated from the DPR’s avowed purpose. Post-RAHRA, the ratio
of the Federal Court of Appeal’s judgment in Apotex stands on shaky
ground.
RAHRA has been criticized for failing to establish clearer guidelines
for medical regulation under the auspices of section 91(27).143 This
critique is not entirely fair. The criminal law represents a blunt instrument for addressing societal ills and possesses little normative flexibility
for careful, let alone, nuanced boundary drawing in matters as intricate
and complex as medical research. That said, there are general principles
which can be drawn from RAHRA around which informed public policy
choices may be made in future. To begin with the obvious, RAHRA does
not disturb the reality that absolute prohibitions on unacceptable medical
technologies or research continue to fall squarely within section 91(27).
Prohibitions of this kind backed by an offence provision and a penalty
clause are the essence of the criminal law. Such prohibitions in the AHR
Act were not challenged nor could their validity be contested.
Second, RAHRA does not foreclose the continued utility of conditional prohibitions, namely, offences permitting exemptions; however, it
limits their reach. This is because the few conditional prohibitions —
designated in the AHR Act as “controlled activities” — upheld in
RAHRA were very narrow in scope.144 In particular, Cromwell J. accepted that conditional prohibitions upon medical research and technologies are permissible provided the exemption from criminal liability
directly assists in defining the scope of the prohibition itself.145 A
143
See, e.g., Barbara von Tigerstrom, “Federal Health Legislation after the Assisted Human
Reproduction Act Reference” (2011) 74 Sask. L. Rev. 33, at 42-43 [hereinafter “von Tigerstrom”];
and Angela Cameron & Vanessa Gruben, “Quebec’s Constitutional Challenge to the Assisted
Human Reproduction Act: Overlooking Women’s Reproductive Autonomy” in S. Patterson, F. Scala
and M. Sokolon, eds., Fertile Ground: Exploring Reproduction in Canada (Montreal: McGillQueen’s
University
Press
2011)
(forthcoming).
(Draft
paper
found
online:
<http://www.commonlaw.uottawa.ca/en/programs/public-law-group/emerging-issues-in-canadianpublic-law.html>.
144
Indeed, in Cromwell J.’s view only three passed constitutional muster, namely, ss. 8, 9
and 12: RAHRA, supra, note 6, at paras. 289-291.
145
Id., at para. 290.
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statutory regime which goes beyond these limited purposes and establishes a wide-ranging regulation of all matters relating to such objectives
would likely not qualify as criminal law and could only be sustained
through a strict application of the ancillary powers doctrine.
Third, it follows that any regulatory scheme created by such exemptions must relate directly to the conduct which is circumscribed by the
prohibition. In her article, Professor von Tigerstrom predicts that as long
as “the aim of ensuring the safety, efficacy and quality of medical
products continues to be accepted as a legitimate criminal law purpose
we probably can be quite confident in saying that the regulatory scheme
is a means to this end rather than an attempt to regulate medical research
and practice per se.”146 With respect, this misreads the majority view in
RAHRA. The degree of constitutionally acceptable medical regulation
under the criminal law power is no longer so open-ended. This is
apparent particularly from Cromwell J.’s endorsement of the Quebec
Court of Appeal’s characterization of the scope of the regulatory regime
contained in the AHR Act.147 Now, there must be a direct correlation
between the particular objective sought to be achieved by the prohibition
and the provisions creating the regulatory scheme designed to achieve
this objective. It stops far short of permitting wide-ranging regulation of
such subjects as processes, procedures, facilities or qualifications of
researchers. These subject-matters would appear no longer to fall within
legitimate regulation under section 91(27).
It should not occasion surprise that the criminal law power is a crude
mechanism to employ for the purpose of closely regulating matters of
public health and safety. Despite this fact, courts have tolerated more and
more extensive regulatory regimes provided they were ostensibly
connected to achieving a public health objective. RAHRA restores some
balance to the enterprise of utilizing section 91(27) for such purposes. It
cabins legitimate health regulation to only those aspects of the subjectmatter in question having a direct and obvious relationship to the
objective of securing public safety by protecting against a public health
evil. This will include establishing baseline standards for medical
products, for example, but does not go so far as to authorize broadly
based statutory and regulatory framework for attaining those standards.
Professor von Tigerstrom laments that RAHRA does not assist in drawing
146
147

von Tigerstrom, supra, note 143, at 42.
See supra, note 102.
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“difficult distinctions … in this complex and evolving area”.148 This,
however, is a criticism which may be levelled at all areas of constitutional law. Only general principles can be established while the regulatory details are left to be determined in accordance with these principles.
RAHRA indicates, at the very least, that federal legislators must proceed
with caution when crafting extensive regulation of medical research.
2. Regulation of Assisted Human Reproduction Technologies
The immediate question in RAHRA’s wake is whether it is still possible to achieve pan-Canadian standards in the regulation of assisted
human reproduction technologies. The answer is “yes” but it will require
forbearance by the federal government and a willingness to cooperate by
provincial governments. Provincial governments would be ill-advised to
walk away from RAHRA without taking up some aspects of the jurisdictional authority in respect of this burgeoning and important medical
technology which the Supreme Court identified as theirs. If nothing else,
political imperatives may spur them to act.
It is true that to date many provincial governments have been reluctant to legislate in the area of assisted reproductive technologies. This
reluctance may be due in large measure to uncertainty over a province’s
ability to legislate in relation to such subject-matter. Parliament’s
enthusiasm for the AHR Act only fuelled such uncertainty. Yet not all
provinces have been reticent. Quebec, for example, following its success
in the province’s appeals court chose to regulate comprehensively
assisted reproductive technologies rather than await the Supreme Court’s
ruling in RAHRA. The Quebec National Assembly enacted An Act
respecting the clinical and research activities relating to assisted
procreation on June 9, 2009.149 As announced in section 1 its avowed
purpose is “to regulate clinical and research activities relating to assisted
procreation in order to ensure high-quality, safe and ethical practices”
and “to encourage the ongoing improvement of services in that area”.150
To that end the legislation establishes regulatory requirements for the
licensing of physicians providing “assisted procreation activities” to

148
149
150

von Tigerstrom, supra, note 143, at 43.
Supra, note 19.
Id., s. 1.
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patients;151 the operation of a “centre for assisted procreation”;152 the
inspection and oversight of such centres’ operations,153 and the permanent
maintenance of records relating to “a person who resorted to assisted
procreation activities or a child born such of activities” with the mandatory
requirement that it is not possible to identify such individuals.154
In view of the demise of much of the AHR Act, however, provinces
may in future be compelled by the judiciary to act to fill the legislative
vacuum. Very recently, for example, the British Columbia Supreme
Court in Pratten v. British Columbia (Attorney General)155 ruled that the
omission of donor offspring from the record-keeping and disclosure
obligations contained in the Adoption Act156 and the Adoption Action:
Financial Administration Act — Adoption Regulation157 violated section
15 of the Charter and failed to qualify as a reasonable limitation upon
those rights for the purposes of section 1. Justice Adair concluded that
denying gametes donor offspring the ability to access information
respecting their biological parents and siblings amounted to discrimination on the basis of manner of conception.158 Furthermore, she held that
the British Columbia Government advanced no pressing or substantial
governmental objective for this under-inclusive statute.159 As a consequence she declared this omission from the impugned sections of the
Adoption Act and the Adoption Regulation unconstitutional but suspended the operation of her declaration of invalidity for 15 months in
order to permit the British Columbia Legislature the opportunity to craft
a new statutory regime which would accommodate the rights of gametes
donor offspring.160 It remains to be seen whether this ruling will be
upheld on appeal.
151

Id., s. 4.
Id., Chapter III, ss. 11-24.
153
Id., Chapter IV, ss. 25-29.
154
Id., Chapter VIII, especially s. 42.
155
[2011] B.C.J. No. 931, 2011 BCSC 656 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Pratten”]. An appeal to
the British Columbia Court of Appeal from this ruling has been initiated. See British Columbia
(Attorney General) v. Pratten, CA 39124.
156
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 5.
157
B.C. Reg. 291/96 [hereinafter “Adoption Regulation”].
158
Pratten, supra, note 155, at para. 268.
159
Id., at para. 325.
160
Id., at para. 333. The Uniform Law Conference of Canada (“ULCC”) prepared a Uniform
Child Status Act intended as a statutory template for provinces and territories to adopt which addresses
certain of the concerns raised in Pratten. The ULCC recommends preparing a new Uniform Vital
Statistics Act to accommodate other issues unique to gametes donor offspring. See online:
152
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To be sure litigation is a protracted, not to mention expensive,
method to attain a desired objective and at times it fails to achieve the
best public policy outcomes. It is encouraging then that provinces have
moved forward to advance interests of persons resorting to assisted
reproductive technologies in the absence of judicial prodding. For
example, despite the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal’s ruling in Cameron v.
Nova Scotia (Attorney General)161 that excluding in vitro fertilization
(“IVF”) from the array of medically necessary services underwritten by
public health insurance plans did not violate the Charter, other provincial
governments have either decided to fund certain assisted reproduction
technologies or to provide financial incentives for individuals choosing
to access them.162 It may be expected that post-RAHRA other governments will assume more and more responsibility for the funding and
regulation of these particular medical technologies.
Not all provinces, however, may feel they possess the administrative
capacity to regulate adequately the myriad issues which attend these
particular technologies. Yet this should not defeat a desire for national
standards to regulate assisted reproductive technologies. There is a way
to achieve this goal which is consistent with the robust concept of cooperative federalism espoused by the Supreme Court of Canada in recent
years.163 Administrative inter-delegation to a single national agency by
provincial and the federal governments of their respective jurisdictional
powers in relation to a particular subject matter has long been accepted
by the Supreme Court in “a venerable chain of judicial precedent”.164 As
<http://www.ulcc.ca/en/poam2/UNIFORM%20LAW%20CONFERENCE%20OF%20CANADA%20F
inal%20Amended.doc>.
161
Supra, note 86.
162
IVF treatments are expensive. One cycle of IVF may cost about $10,000, but these costs
may rise to $20,000 if the woman requires higher doses of medication. At present, Quebec offers
public funding for up to three cycles of IVF; Ontario funds IVF treatments only for women with
bilateral fallopian tube obstruction, and Manitoba offers a provincial tax credit of up to $8,000 for
assisted reproductive technology. The Ontario Government’s Expert Panel on Fertility and Adoption
in its report entitled “Raising Expectations” recommended in 2009 that provincial funding should be
enhanced to include up to three cycles of IVF of infertile women under 42 years of age. Alberta has
committed to reviewing its policy in respect of IVF funding. For a complete survey of IVF funding
across Canada, see Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in Health, Status of Public
Funding for In Vitro Fertilization in Canada and Internationally (December 2010), online:
<http://www.cadth.ca/media/pdf/Public_Funding_IVF_es-14_e.pdf>.
163
See, e.g., NIL/TU,O Child and Family Services Society v. B.C. Government and Services
Employees’ Union, [2010] S.C.J. No. 45, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 696, at para. 42 (S.C.C.), per Abella J.
164
Fédération des producteurs de volailles du Québec v. Pelland, [2005] S.C.J. No. 19,
[2005] 1 S.C.R. 292, at para. 52 (S.C.C.). These authorities include Prince Edward Island (Potato
Marketing Board) v. H.B. Willis Inc., [1952] S.C.J. No. 31, [1952] 2 S.C.R. 392 (S.C.C.); Coughlin
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described in Fédération des producteurs de volailles du Québec v.
Pelland165 to be effective such an inter-delegation would require each
level of government to enact laws and regulations based on “their
respective legislative competencies, to create a unified and coherent
regulatory scheme”166 and to delegate the administration of this scheme
to a single regulatory agency created by Parliament.
Such an agency already exists even after RAHRA. The legitimacy of
the Assisted Human Reproduction Agency of Canada created in section
21 of the AHR Act was never attacked. As a consequence it survived the
Supreme Court’s judgment and now is available to be utilized in much
the same way as the inter-provincial agricultural marketing schemes have
been for a number of decades. It remains for the various provinces to
take the initiative to develop a regulatory scheme over assisted reproductive technologies. The Quebec law is now in place and can serve as a
model for other provinces to emulate. The administration of these
schemes could then be delegated to the Assisted Human Reproduction
Agency of Canada. Such an arrangement would permit national standards to be achieved yet also take into account local initiatives and
values. Not only would this demonstrate that RAHRA did not destroy the
ability to achieve pan-Canadian regulatory standards in relation to
sophisticated medical technologies but it would evidence that there are
creative yet constitutional solutions to achieving such a desirable social
and political end.

v. Ontario (Highway Transport Board), [1968] S.C.J. No. 38, [1968] S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.); Manitoba
(Attorney General) v. Manitoba Egg and Poultry Assn., [1971] S.C.J. No. 63, [1971] S.C.R. 689
(S.C.C.); Reference re Agricultural Products Marketing Act, 1970 (Canada), [1978] S.C.J. No. 58,
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198, and Pelland, id.
165
Id.
166
Id., at para. 38.

